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255 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Under Title VII After Baldwin v. Foxx 
By Ryan H. Nelson* 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Baldwin 
v. Foxx opined—for the first time—that employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Article tackles the two 
administrative law questions that Baldwin poses: what level of 
deference should a court afford Baldwin, and should such 
deference force that court to overturn precedent holding that 
sexual orientation discrimination lies beyond the purview of Title 
VII? 
First, after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnhart, lower 
courts have split on whether Chevron Step Zero should be 
governed by the rule-of-law test announced in Christensen and 
Mead, or whether Barnhart’s five-factor test provides a new 
standard for this inquiry. This Article explains why the 
Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test should govern Chevron Step 
Zero; why that test dictates that courts should analyze Baldwin 
under the deference test announced in Skidmore, not Chevron; 
and why Baldwin consequently deserves de minimis deference. 
Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brand X held that 
judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes must be overturned 
in the face of subsequent, contrary agency interpretations that 
would have earned Chevron deference but for stare decisis. Yet, no 
exception to stare decisis exists when an agency interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute earns mere Skidmore deference. This Article 
examines such a potential exception, concluding that stare decisis 
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should trump agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, 
Skidmore deference notwithstanding. 
This Article concludes that Baldwin is far from a watershed 
moment for LGBT workplace equality. Rather, the courts—which 
have almost uniformly held that employment discrimination 
based on sexual orientation does not violate Title VII—should 
uphold such decisions despite Baldwin and the meager Skidmore 
deference it earns. Indeed, congressional action remains the only 
way to ban employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation on a national scale. 
I. Introduction 
On July 16, 2015, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) issued its opinion in Baldwin v. Foxx,1 
concluding that allegations of employment discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of 
discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).2 While Baldwin is 
technically limited to workplaces in the federal sector, there is 
little doubt that the EEOC and the plaintiffs’ bar will seek to use 
the opinion in litigation to support the position that employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violates Title 
VII. To that end, this Article focuses on two of the prospective 
questions that will inevitably dog courts hearing such cases in the 
months and years to come: what level of deference should courts 
afford the Baldwin decision, if any, and should such deference 
force courts to overturn existing precedent holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination is beyond the purview of Title VII? 
Part II of this Article argues that Baldwin presents an ideal 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify whether an 
administrative agency interpretation must have the force of law 
for a court to analyze that interpretation under the deference test 
announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
                                                                                                     
 1. Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 16, 2015). 
 2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964). 
See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10. 
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Council, Inc.,3 as suggested by the Court’s prior decisions in 
Christensen v. Harris County4 and United States v. Mead Corp.,5 
or conversely, whether the five-factor test announced in Barnhart 
v. Walton6 is more than mere dicta, providing instead a new 
standard in assessing which deference test applies to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it administers. This Article concludes 
that the Barnhart factors are mere dicta, that the “force of law” 
rule endorsed by both Christensen and Mead should continue to 
control the Chevron Step Zero inquiry,7 and consequently, that 
Baldwin should be analyzed under the framework established in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,8 not Chevron. Assuming the foregoing to 
be true, applying Skidmore demonstrates that Baldwin earns but 
a modicum of deference—so little, in fact, that one could question 
whether the opinion earns any deference at all. 
Part III explores Baldwin’s potential to answer another 
administrative law question left as-yet unanswered by the 
Supreme Court. In National Cable & Telecommunication Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Services,9 the Court settled the tension between 
judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes and subsequent, 
contrary agency interpretations that would have been entitled to 
Chevron deference but for adherence to stare decisis.10 In sum, 
Brand X announced a new rule that Chevron deference to an 
agency’s interpretation must trump traditional notions of stare 
decisis so long as the statute at issue is ambiguous.11 However, 
the Court has yet to address this tension when the agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute lacks the force of law (for 
instance, when the interpretation earns only some level of 
                                                                                                     
 3. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 4. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 5. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 6. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 7. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 
(2006) [hereinafter Chevron Step Zero] (providing “an understanding of the 
foundations and nature of the Step Zero dilemma” and suggesting how to 
resolve this dilemma). 
 8. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 9. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 10. Id. at 984–86. 
 11. Id. 
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Skidmore deference). This Article concludes that courts should 
stand by their interpretations of ambiguous statutes rather than 
uproot them in the face of subsequent, contrary agency 
interpretations lacking the force of law. Applying that conclusion 
here, and assuming arguendo the conclusion in Part I to be 
correct, the courts—which have almost uniformly held that 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation lies 
beyond the reach of Title VII12—should uphold their decisions, 
despite the Baldwin opinion and the meager Skidmore deference 
courts must afford it. 
In sum, this Article concludes that Baldwin does not bring 
advocates of a national ban on employment discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation to the finish line; rather, it reminds us 
how much farther we still have to go. While the opinion reaches 
the right result, it earns de minimis deference, the likes of which 
should not overturn contrary court decisions interpreting Title 
VII. As such—even in the wake of Baldwin—the one and only 
way to ban employment discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation on a national scale is for Congress to act. 
II. Chevron Step Zero 
The Supreme Court’s landmark Chevron decision held that, 
under certain circumstances, courts must defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that it 
administers.13 To qualify for Chevron deference, a court must ask 
whether Congress has directly spoken on the precise question at 
issue and, if so, give effect to Congress’s unambiguously 
expressed intent (Chevron Step One); if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation of 
the statute so long as it is permissible (Chevron Step Two).14 In 
contrast, agency interpretations that do not qualify for Chevron 
                                                                                                     
 12. See infra note 71 (enumerating cases in which courts have found that 
Title VII does not apply to sexual orientation discrimination). 
 13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
 14. Id. at 842–43. 
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deference are analyzed under the test announced in Skidmore,15 
which requires courts to afford weight to agency interpretations 
depending on: (i) the thoroughness evident in the agency’s 
consideration; (ii) the validity of the agency’s reasoning; (iii) the 
agency’s consistency with earlier and later pronouncements; and 
(iv) all those factors that give the agency power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.16 
Yet, a trio of Supreme Court cases in the early 2000s 
attempted to address a vital threshold question colloquially 
known as Chevron Step Zero: which agency interpretations 
should be analyzed under the Chevron test, as compared to the 
Skidmore test?17 As demonstrated below, those three cases lay 
out the precedent necessary to conclude that the EEOC’s Baldwin 
opinion should be analyzed under Skidmore, not Chevron. 
A. Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart 
First, in Christensen, the Court considered what deferential 
weight to afford an opinion letter issued by the Wage and Hour 
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor, holding that  
[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law [and were not arrived at after, for example, a 
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking]—do 
not warrant Chevron-style deference. Instead, interpretations 
contained in formats such as opinion letters are “entitled to 
respect” under our decision in [Skidmore], but only to the 
extent that those interpretations have the “power to 
persuade.”18  
Yet, the Court declined to clarify whether the opinion letter was 
not subjected to a Chevron analysis because: (i) it “lack[ed] the 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(distinguishing decisions in the format of opinion letters from those subject to 
the Chevron test). 
 16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 17. See infra Part II.A (discussing Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart). 
 18. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
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force of law”; (ii) it was not arrived at after formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking; or (iii) both.19 Accordingly, post-
Christensen, it was clear that such agency opinion letters are 
insufficient to be tested under the Chevron framework, but it was 
unclear precisely what would be sufficient or necessary to qualify 
for testing under Chevron. 
Second, in Mead, the Court considered a tariff clarification 
ruling by the United States Customs Service.20 Similar to 
Christensen, the Court found that Skidmore was the appropriate 
standard by which to test the agency’s interpretation, holding 
that Chevron deference applies “when it appears that Congress 
has delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”21 With this proclamation, the Mead Court took a step 
farther than Christensen by noting that interpretations “carrying 
the force of law” are sufficient to garner Chevron deference. 
Moreover, the Court went on to note in dicta that Chevron 
deference can be, and has been, found “even when 
no . . . administrative formality was required and none was 
afforded,”22 thereby taking yet another step beyond Christensen 
by stating that formal adjudication was unnecessary to garner 
Chevron deference. 
Reading Christensen and Mead in tandem shows that an 
interpretation having the “force of law” is not only sufficient for 
that interpretation to be tested under Chevron, but necessary to 
do so. More specifically, post-Christensen but pre-Mead, we knew 
that one of the following three scenarios was true, although we 
did not know which: 
1. It was necessary that the opinion letter possessed the 
force of law to be tested under Chevron. Whether it resulted 
from formal adjudication was irrelevant. 
                                                                                                     
 19. See generally id.; see also Chevron Step Zero, supra note 7, at 211–12 
(discussing the ambiguity created by the analysis in Christensen). 
 20. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 21. Id. at 226–27 (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. at 231. 
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2. It was necessary that the opinion letter resulted from 
formal adjudication to be tested under Chevron. Whether it 
possessed the force of law was irrelevant. 
3. It was necessary that the opinion letter possessed the 
force of law and resulted from formal adjudication to be tested 
under Chevron. 
Subsequently, Mead’s dicta clarified that formal adjudication 
is unnecessary to test an interpretation under Chevron, thereby 
eliminating options two and three above. Accordingly, viewing 
Christensen through the lens of Mead demonstrates that an 
agency’s interpretation must possess the force of law to be tested 
under Chevron.23 This conclusion seemingly was thrown into 
doubt, however, by the third case in the Chevron Step Zero trio: 
Barnhart. 
In Barnhart, the Court considered a Social Security 
Administration regulation that had been adopted after notice and 
comment procedures,24 although the agency had first adopted the 
interpretation informally.25 The Court found that Chevron was 
the appropriate means of testing the regulation for deference, 
citing Mead’s dicta for the proposition that the agency did not 
lose the protection of Chevron merely because it had previously 
reached its interpretation without resorting to formal 
rulemaking.26 In so doing, Barnhart transformed Mead’s dicta 
into binding law.27 Yet, interestingly, Barnhart did not stop there. 
The Court went on to explain that Chevron deference was the 
appropriate test because of (i) the interstitial nature of the legal 
question; (ii) the related expertise of the agency; (iii) the 
importance of the question to the administration of the statute; 
(iv) the complexity of that administration; and (v) the careful 
consideration the agency had given the question over a long 
period of time.28 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 237–38. 
 24. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 25. Id. at 221–22. 
 26. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001)). 
 27. Id. at 222. 
 28. Id. 
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Predictably, the introduction of these Barnhart factors into 
Chevron Step Zero threw the lower courts into “a kind of Step 
Zero chaos”;29 some have maintained that Christensen and Mead 
dictate that an agency interpretation must be tested under 
Chevron if it carries the force of law, while others have held that 
interpretations must be analyzed pursuant to Barnhart’s five-
factor test to make the same call.30 This split in authority is most 
relevant to the instant matter; indeed, as demonstrated below, 
Baldwin should be tested under Skidmore if the 
Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test governs and under Chevron if 
the Barnhart five-factor test governs. 
B. Applying the Chevron Step Zero Trio to Baldwin 
Foremost, it is clear that Congress did not give the EEOC the 
authority to promulgate regulations under Title VII.31 As such, 
the EEOC cannot issue opinions interpreting Title VII that carry 
the force of law.32 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that 
EEOC guidance interpreting Title VII does not carry the force of 
law,33 and the only court to consider whether EEOC opinions 
carry the force of law has likewise concluded that they do not.34 
                                                                                                     
 29. Chevron Step Zero, supra note 7, at 221. 
 30. Compare Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 
922 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 
2003) (applying Mead), and Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 
2003) (same), with Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1011–13 
(9th Cir. 2002) (applying Barnhart), and Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 
875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002) (same), and Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 
383 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2004) (same), and Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. 
Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2002) (same). For a detailed discussion 
of this split in authority, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled 
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1458–64 (2005). 
 31. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (“Congress, in 
enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules 
or regulations pursuant to that Title.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 995, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–59 (1991), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006). 
 34. See Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 479 F.3d 936, 943 (8th Cir. 2007) 
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Thus, if the Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test governs Chevron 
Step Zero, Baldwin should be tested under Skidmore. 
Yet, if Barnhart’s five-factor test controls, the analysis is far 
more complex. The first of the five Barnhart factors (that is, 
whether the nature of the legal question at issue is 
“interstitial”)35 poses a surprisingly difficult question, given that 
the Court has failed to define which legal questions it considers 
“interstitial” and which it does not. Indeed, the Court has only 
referenced this “interstitial” language once since Barnhart, and 
in so doing gave an example of an allegedly interstitial legal 
question but failed to explain why the question was interstitial.36 
Respected scholars have defined interstitial per Barnhart to 
mean interpretations that are “less central to a [regulatory] 
scheme”37 or raise less important questions of law.38 Professor 
Sunstein even buttresses his view by quoting a now-famous 1986 
law review article written by the author of the Barnhart 
opinion—then Judge Breyer on the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals: “Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and 
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to 
answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily 
administration.”39 Accordingly, it appears that the author of the 
Barnhart opinion himself believed interstitial to mean “of less 
importance,” as compared to “major questions.” 
                                                                                                     
(“An agency’s interpretation that is found in an opinion letter, policy statement, 
agency manual or enforcement guide ‘lack[s] the force of law’ . . . .”).  
 35. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
 36. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89–90 
(2007) (“[T]he matter at issue—i.e., the calculation method for determining 
whether a state aid program ‘equalizes expenditures’—is the kind of highly 
technical, specialized interstitial matter that Congress often does not decide 
itself, but delegates to specialized agencies to decide.”). The Court failed to 
clarify whether “highly technical” and “specialized” are synonyms for 
“interstitial,” or whether “interstitial” modifies the word “matter” in some other 
way. Id. 
 37. David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons 
from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1934 n.65 (2014). 
 38. See Chevron Step Zero, supra note 7, at 198–99 (describing how the 
importance of the question of law inversely relates to its interstitial nature). 
 39. Id. at 200 n.62 (citing Hon. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of 
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)). 
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With all due respect to these scholars, and especially to 
Justice Breyer, interstitial does not mean less central to a 
regulatory scheme or less important. On the contrary, interstitial 
is defined as anything “related to or situated in the [spaces that 
intervene between things],”40 meaning that something is 
interstitial because it relates to the spaces or gaps between 
things—not necessarily because it is less central to a regulatory 
scheme or less important. This begs the question: when does an 
agency interpretation relate to the spaces or gaps between 
things? As it turns out, the Court has already answered that 
question. In Brand X, the Court held that a statute has no 
“gap[s]” if it “unambiguously forecloses the agency’s 
interpretation.”41 Unsurprisingly, the Court has adopted a well-
established line of precedent aimed at determining whether a 
statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation—
indeed, this is the very question posed by Chevron Step One.42 
Now, combine all of these propositions: The interstitial 
nature of an agency interpretation is arguably relevant to 
Chevron Step Zero (see the first of Barnhart’s five factors), 
meaning that an agency interpretation relating to gaps (see the 
dictionary definition of “interstitial”) is more apt to be tested 
under Chevron than an agency interpretation that does not, and 
because an interpretation relates to gaps if it progresses past 
Chevron Step One (see Brand X), application of Barnhart’s five 
factors implies that Chevron Step One is relevant to determining 
Chevron Step Zero. In other words, if an agency’s interpretation 
would progress from Chevron Step One to Chevron Step Two, 
then the agency’s interpretation is necessarily interstitial, which 
supports a finding that Chevron is the appropriate standard à la 
Barnhart’s multi-factor test of Chevron Step Zero. Notably, such 
                                                                                                     
 40. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 655 (11th ed. 2006). 
 41. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 983 (2005). 
 42. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007) 
(“Neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the Secretary’s 
method would be determinative if the statute’s plain language unambiguously 
indicated Congress’ intent to foreclose the Secretary’s interpretation.”) (citing 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984)). 
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an interpretation is consistent with Barnhart itself because the 
Barnhart Court’s analysis proceeded to Chevron Step Two.43 
Applying this understanding of Barnhart here, the EEOC’s 
opinion in Baldwin must be interstitial because Congress has 
never spoken on the precise issue of whether sexual orientation 
qualifies as sex discrimination,44 thereby implying that the 
agency’s interpretation would progress from Chevron Step One to 
Step Two, were Chevron the appropriate standard. Accordingly, 
this factor weighs in favor of Chevron being the appropriate test 
here. Note that courts would likely reach the opposite result if 
interstitial meant less central to a regulatory scheme or less 
important. In fact, there arguably are fewer issues of more 
importance to Title VII than which classifications are protected 
and which are not, and scant issues enjoy more importance today 
than whether employers should have the right to discriminate 
against applicants and employees on the basis of their sexual 
orientation; after all, the inclusion of “sexual orientation” as 
stand-alone language in Title VII has been raised in practically 
every congressional session for the past twenty years.45 
The second Barnhart factor concerns the agency’s related 
expertise.46 The EEOC certainly carries expertise in what 
constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII, as it serves as the 
sole federal agency charged with enforcing that statute.47 Hence, 
this factor strongly supports testing Baldwin under Chevron. 
The third Barnhart factor asks not whether the 
interpretation is important generally, but whether the 
                                                                                                     
 43. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2002) (proceeding from a 
determination that the statute was ambiguous to an assessment of whether the 
agency interpretation was reasonable). 
 44. See Michael Gold, 7 Questions About the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act You Needed Answered, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-11-04/features/bal-questions-about-the-
employment-nondiscrimination-act-20131104_1_gender-identity-enda-senate-
vote (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (discussing the lack of existing federal legislation 
protecting sexual orientation from discrimination) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
 47. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 253 
(1964). 
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interpretation is important “to the administration of the 
statute.”48 Here, the EEOC’s Baldwin opinion is incredibly 
important to the administration of Title VII because it 
determines whether the EEOC will accept and pursue charges of 
discrimination alleging sexual orientation discrimination. Had 
the Baldwin decision determined that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not tantamount to sex discrimination, the 
EEOC’s administration of Title VII would be markedly different 
going forward. As such, this factor almost assuredly weighs in 
favor of Chevron being the appropriate test here. 
The fourth Barnhart factor concerns the complexity of the 
agency’s administration of the statute,49 where (ostensibly) the 
more complex the administration of a statute, the more likely the 
agency’s interpretation would be to trigger Chevron as the 
appropriate test. Here, Title VII is simply not a complex statute, 
especially when contrasted against the Social Security Act,50 
which the Barnhart Court identified as being complex.51 For one 
thing, if a statute is complex, it would be more likely that 
Congress would vest in the agency responsible for administering 
that statute the right to promulgate regulations to ensure its 
appropriate administration. Yet, as noted above, Congress did not 
vest in the EEOC the power to promulgate regulations under 
Title VII.52 Moreover, the sheer breadth of the Social Security Act 
(over 70 sections spanning over 1000 pages) dwarfs that of Title 
VII (16 sections spanning 14 pages).53 Accordingly, this factor 
arguably weighs in favor of Skidmore being the appropriate test 
for Baldwin. 
The fifth and final Barnhart factor asks about “the careful 
consideration the agency had given the question over a long 
                                                                                                     
 48. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
 51. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222–25 (2002) (describing the 
many components of the statute and the kinds of claims it encompasses). 
 52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 53. Compare 49 Stat. 620 (detailing the administration of social security 
benefits), with Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 
(1964) (providing for equal employment opportunities). 
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period of time.”54 As the Supreme Court has held, an EEOC 
interpretation “does not fare well” when it was neither 
contemporaneous with its enactment nor consistent since the 
statute came into law.55 Applying that standard here, this factor 
strongly supports testing the opinion under Skidmore because 
Baldwin was issued over fifty years after Title VII passed and 
because the EEOC concedes that it held a contrary view of Title 
VII until very recently.56 
In sum, three of the five Barnhart factors arguably weigh in 
favor of Baldwin being tested under Chevron, whereas two 
factors arguably point toward Skidmore as the appropriate test. 
All factors being equal (an assumption that certainly could be 
challenged), Baldwin should be tested under Chevron if the 
Barnhart factors control the Chevron Step Zero analysis. Yet, to 
say this conclusion is tenuous is a gross understatement as it 
relies upon a novel interpretation of the word interstitial, as well 
as several assumptions that could rightly be deemed judgment 
calls (for example, that the question posed in Baldwin is 
important to the administration of Title VII). As such, my point 
here is not that Baldwin would be tested under Chevron if the 
Barnhart test controls, but that Baldwin could—and probably 
should—be tested under Chevron if the Barnhart test controls. 
This Article aims only to demonstrate the need for clarification 
from the Court, given that the Christensen/Mead line of cases and 
Barnhart arguably point in different directions when applied to 
the Baldwin opinion. 
C. Which Approach Is Correct? 
The Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test should control 
Chevron Step Zero. Foremost, had the Barnhart Court meant to 
                                                                                                     
 54. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
 55. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991) 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006). 
 56. See supra note 2 (noting that in Baldwin the EEOC opined for the first 
time that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  
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revise its rule-of-law test—a test it had endorsed just a term 
earlier in Mead—it almost assuredly would have done so 
explicitly. And, if that were the case, the Court probably would 
have devoted more than a single paragraph to revising itself. 
Moreover, the Barnhart Court did not need the five-factor test to 
arrive at the result it reached, further suggesting that the factors 
were mere dicta. Indeed, the Court noted that the regulations at 
issue had the force of law and subsequently concluded that the 
agency’s interpretation should be tested under Chevron. That 
conclusion is hardly novel; it is the very conclusion reached by the 
Mead court, which Barnhart approvingly cites. 
Subjecting Baldwin to the Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test, 
the result is clear: the Baldwin opinion does not have the force of 
law because the EEOC has not promulgated regulations 
implementing Title VII. As such, the opinion must be tested 
under Skidmore, not Chevron.57 Applying Skidmore to Baldwin 
does not bode well for the EEOC. Arguably, the first Skidmore 
factor—the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning—is a toss-up, 
weighing neither for, nor against, deference. True: the opinion is 
thorough when discussing the points of view that support its 
conclusion, but it fails to distinguish the myriad cases holding 
that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
not tantamount to sex discrimination under Title VII. A thorough 
argument not only illuminates those propositions that support it, 
but also decries those propositions that oppose it.58 Baldwin 
accomplishes only half of this imperative. 
                                                                                                     
 57. See also Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing 
Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 
MO. L. REV. 949, 976 (2009) (“Under the relevant standards of agency deference, 
even the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII created using formal procedures 
are entitled to, at most, Skidmore deference, not Chevron deference.”). 
 58. HOWARD KAHANE & NANCY CAVENDER, LOGIC AND CONTEMPORARY 
RHETORIC: THE USE OF REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 226 (10th ed. 2006) (“Never 
simply ignore counterarguments or reasons.”); WILLIAM PUTMAN & JENNIFER 
ALBRIGHT, LEGAL RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND WRITING 213 (3d ed. 2002) 
(“Counteranalysis is the process of discovering and presenting 
counterarguments to a legal position or argument. It is important because to 
adequately address a legal problem, all aspects of the problem must be 
considered.”).  
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The second and fourth Skidmore factors—the validity of the 
agency’s reasoning and the agency’s “power to persuade”—have 
always confused scholars.59 They appear to encourage courts to 
defer to agency interpretations that are well-reasoned. Yet, that 
proposition is puzzling. The very notion contravenes the theory of 
deference to administrative agencies; the necessity of deference to 
administrative agency opinions is borne of a divergence between 
the agency’s view and that of the judiciary. If those views 
harmonized, there would be no need for deference. As such, this 
Article finds only that these factors encourage a court to “defer” 
to the EEOC if it already agrees with the EEOC’s opinion. Again, 
therefore, these factors are a toss-up when it comes to a court 
deferring to Baldwin. 
Finally, the third Skidmore factor—the agency’s consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements—weighs strongly against 
the EEOC. As noted above, in Baldwin itself the agency concedes 
that the opinion contradicts earlier-held agency interpretations.60 
Thus, it is difficult to definitively argue that any of the Skidmore 
factors weigh in favor of deferring to the EEOC. At most, the 
Baldwin decision should earn de minimis deference under 
Skidmore, yet it seems more reasonable that Baldwin should 
earn no deference at all. 
III. A Brand X for Skidmore Deference? 
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Maislin Industries, Inc. v. 
Primary Steel,61 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,62 and Neal v. United 
                                                                                                     
 59. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial 
Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 39, 58 (2003) (noting that, although “deference is compatible with a court[] 
ultimately reaching a conclusion different from the agency’s after weighing the 
agency’s opinion,” it is “incompatible with reviewing the agency’s interpretation 
only after the court has already interpreted the statute, and rejecting the 
agency opinion if it does not coincide with the court’s”). 
 60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (presenting the EEOC’s 
evolution of interpretation regarding sexual discrimination under Title VII).  
 61. 497 U.S. 116 (1990), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 
Allstate Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., No. 2: 93-CV-323, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21540, at *11 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 1994). See id. at 131 (noting that, if the court 
finds the statute to be clear, it must adhere to stare decisis and the court must 
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States63 made it clear that if a court had previously found a 
statute to be unambiguous, then a subsequent, contrary agency 
interpretation of that statute would not trump traditional notions 
of stare decisis, regardless of what level of deference the 
interpretation was entitled to.64 In other words, if a court has 
already found a statute to be clear, an agency cannot change that 
interpretation. After all, “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”65 
But, what if the law is unclear and Congress has vested in an 
administrative agency the authority to fill in the gaps? That issue 
was front and center in Brand X, where the Supreme Court held 
that if a court has not found a statute to be unambiguous, a 
subsequent, contrary agency interpretation of that statute that 
otherwise would have been entitled to Chevron deference would 
trump stare decisis.66 In other words, so long as an agency is 
filling in the gaps by interpreting an unclear statute and that 
agency is acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority 
to do so, then the agency’s interpretation should control (within 
the bounds of reason), despite a court’s prior pronouncement. 
                                                                                                     
“judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior 
determination of the statute’s meaning”). 
 62. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). See id. at 536–37 (quoting Maislin, 497 U.S. at 
131) (“Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that 
determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later 
interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s 
meaning.”). 
 63. 516 U.S. 284 (1996). See id. at 295 (“Our reluctance to overturn 
precedents derives in part from institutional concerns about the relationship of 
the Judiciary to Congress. One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis 
in the area of statutory construction is that ‘Congress is free to change this 
Court’s interpretation of its legislation.’”). 
 64. See also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (ruling that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a 
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference 
only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion”). 
 65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 66. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–85 (deciding that, instead of adhering to 
its own judicial precedent regarding an interpretation of Communications Act, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should have accorded a Federal 
Communications Commission ruling Chevron deference). 
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The Supreme Court, however, has yet to fill in the final blank 
in this line of cases. That is, if a court has not found a statute to 
be unambiguous, should stare decisis prevail in the face of a 
subsequent, contrary agency interpretation that would not 
otherwise have been entitled to Chevron deference (for instance, 
the interpretation would have otherwise been entitled only to 
some level of Skidmore deference)?67 In other words, if a court has 
already interpreted a statute to mean A, but that court declines 
to hold that the statute is clear, can an agency fill in the gaps by 
interpreting the unclear statute to mean B, even if it acts without 
the force of law? 
Scholars are divided on how to answer this question,68 
although the lower courts appear to have held uniformly that 
stare decisis trumps an agency interpretation of an unclear 
statute unless and until the agency issues regulations to the 
contrary that earn Chevron deference.69 The Brand X opinion 
                                                                                                     
 67. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1304–05 (2007) (“Skidmore is 
neither discussed nor even cited in any of the opinions issued in Brand X, even 
though Skidmore deference shares the same tension with stare decisis as 
Chevron previously did.”). 
 68. Compare Bressman, supra note 30 at 1467 n.157 (asserting that an 
agency interpretation of an unclear statute entitled only to Skidmore deference 
should trump a court’s prior, contrary opinion), and Brian Galle & Mark 
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and 
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2001 n.285 (2008) 
(“Professor Galle . . . believes it is inevitable that there soon will be a Brand X 
for the Skidmore doctrine.”), with Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being 
Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of 
Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 845 
(2010) (“It is uncertain, but may be unlikely, that an authoritative agency 
interpretation that is eligible for Skidmore, but not Chevron, deference can 
displace a judicial interpretation that was made in the absence of an agency 
interpretation.”), and Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts 
Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 
EMORY L.J. 1, 41 (2011) (describing how Brand X requires, under Chevron, a 
court to accept an agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute, 
even if the court has already disagreed with that interpretation, as opposed to 
“lesser standards of deference,” such as that of Skidmore, which “do not demand 
that a court give up its prerogative to discern the ‘best’ interpretation of a 
statute”), and Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, supra note 67, at 
1305 (“[I]t is far from clear . . . that Skidmore should trump judicial precedent.”). 
 69. See White & Case LLP v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 12, 23 (2009) 
(declining to give the agency’s decision any form of deference); Michael Simon 
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itself purports to answer the question, albeit in dicta. Specifically, 
the Brand X majority responds to the concerns of Justice Scalia’s 
dissent—that is, that the opinion makes “judicial decisions 
subject to reversal by executive officers”—by explaining that an 
agency vested with congressional authority to administer 
ambiguous statutes “remains the authoritative interpreter 
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In all other 
respects, the court’s prior ruling remains binding law (for 
example, as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is 
inapplicable).”70 Yet, because the underlying agency 
interpretation at issue in Brand X was entitled to Chevron 
deference, the Court’s observation is not binding. 
The resolution of this open issue is paramount here because 
none of the courts to address whether sexual orientation 
discrimination is tantamount to sex discrimination under Title 
VII have held that Title VII is clear on the issue (nor should they, 
because Title VII is anything but clear on the matter), and the 
overwhelming majority of those courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion as the EEOC.71 This unique procedural posture 
                                                                                                     
Design, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that the court “did not accord the appropriate deference 
to Customs’ rulings as called for by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Mead. . . .”). 
 70. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 982 (2005); see also Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power, 
and the Varieties of Environmental Litigation: Symposium: The Jurisprudence 
of Justice Stevens: Panel III: Administrative Law/Statutory Interpretation, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 2006 (2006) (citing the Brand X dicta for the proposition 
that “the Court seems to be acknowledging, albeit in passing, judicial power to 
articulate ‘binding law’ on the basis of ambiguous statutes in some cases” (that 
is, where Chevron deference does not apply)).  
 71. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 
2006) (“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts 
under Title VII.”); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (“Title VII’s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a 
person’s sexuality.”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Title VII 
does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”); 
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[H]arassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation 
(and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”); 
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) 
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positions Baldwin as a vehicle to answer the question left open 
after Maislin, Lechmere, Neal, and Brand X—assuming, of 
course, that the reviewing court maintains that Title VII is 
ambiguous on this issue and that binding precedent would 
compel the court to hold that sexual orientation discrimination 
would not run afoul of Title VII but for some modicum of 
Skidmore deference owed to Baldwin.72 
To begin answering that question, we must ask why Maislin, 
Lechmere, and Neal favored stare decisis over agency 
interpretations and why Brand X did not. First, the Brand X 
Court noted that Chevron deference should trump precedent 
interpreting an ambiguous statute because of rule of law 
concerns. As the Court explained, “Chevron established a 
‘presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute 
                                                                                                     
(“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual 
orientation.”); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir. 
1996) (“Title VII does not prohibit conduct based on the employee’s sexual 
orientation, whether homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual.”); Williamson v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Title VII does not 
prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ 
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should 
not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.”); 
Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (“We . . . hold 
that Title VII cannot be strained to [forbid an employer from rejecting a job 
applicant based on his or her affectional or sexual preference].”). But see Terveer 
v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying an employer’s 
motion to dismiss an employee’s claim under Title VII that his sexual 
orientation was not consistent with the employer’s gender stereotypes). 
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by the Fifth Circuit’s Smith decision 
above because, “[u]nder Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc), [the Eleventh Circuit] is bound by cases decided by the 
former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.” Baloco v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 
1338, 1343 n.6 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 72. Although no court should conclude that Title VII is clear here, I readily 
concede that a reviewing court could distinguish controlling precedent, thereby 
obviating the need to reach the instant tension between stare decisis and 
Skidmore deference. For example, despite the near ubiquity of circuit courts 
dismissing claims of sexual orientation discrimination of Title VII, several of 
these opinions predate relevant legal theories that could point the court in the 
opposite direction (for example, the gender stereotyping theory announced in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“In the specific context of 
sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”)).  
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meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the 
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, 
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess 
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.’”73 Yet, were 
the Court to have held that stare decisis trumped Chevron 
deference, reviewing courts could have reached divergent results 
based solely upon the order in which the court and agency issued 
their interpretations. For example, assume a court construes an 
unclear statute to mean A before an agency promulgates 
regulations implementing it. If the agency then issues regulations 
stating that the statute means B, a court construing that statute 
thereafter would be bound by Chevron to find that the statute 
means B—assuming that such a construction is reasonable. As 
per Brand X, the possibility of such anomalous results counsels in 
favor of Chevron deference trumping contrary court 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 
Second, the Brand X Court cited a separation of powers 
rationale. The majority echoed the concern Justice Scalia raised 
in his dissent in Mead that favoring stare decisis could ossify 
large swaths of statutory law, thereby eliminating the “exercise of 
continuing agency discretion,” despite Congress having vested in 
an agency that very discretion.74 This apparent ability of the 
judicial branch to thwart the legislative branch and divest 
authority from the executive branch likewise counsels against 
upholding traditional notions of stare decisis here. 
Now, apply these dual rationales to our instant dilemma. 
Both rationales presuppose that Congress has vested in the 
agency the power to promulgate regulations implementing the 
                                                                                                     
 73. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 
740–41 (1996)). 
 74. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[w]orst of all, the majority’s approach will lead to the 
ossification of large portions of our statutory law. Where Chevron applies, 
statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities subject to the agency’s ongoing 
clarification. They create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing 
agency discretion.”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) (discussing the ossification as a result of “precluding 
agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes” and 
noting that “[n]either Chevron nor the doctrine of stare decisis requires these 
haphazard results”) (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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statute in question. Yet, as noted above, Congress has not vested 
in the EEOC the power to promulgate regulations under Title 
VII.75 Absent such congressional authority, the rule-of-law 
concern that the Brand X Court cited loses some of its strength. 
On one hand, courts could reach discordant holdings simply on 
account of an interposed agency interpretation. For example, 
assume a court interprets an unclear statute to mean A and an 
agency later issues informal guidance interpreting that statute to 
mean B. A court subsequently reviewing the statute could find it 
appropriate to afford the informal guidance Skidmore deference 
and that doing so tips the scales in favor of the agency’s position. 
Such a result is not preordained, however; whereas a court bound 
by Chevron deference would be required to favor the agency’s 
position so long as it is reasonable, Skidmore requires far less 
deference to an agency’s position. What results is less risk of a 
rule-of-law problem, although the problem certainly persists. 
Moreover, while it takes months, or even years, for an agency 
to navigate the notice-and-comment period required to 
promulgate regulations entitled to Chevron deference, there are 
no preconditions to an agency issuing an immediate 
interpretation deserving of Skidmore deference. Thus, agencies 
could eliminate any potential rule-of-law concerns by simply 
announcing their interpretation of a statute before courts have 
the opportunity to review that statute—or, at the very latest, via 
an amicus brief during pending litigation. 
On a similar note, Brand X’s separation-of-powers rationale 
for favoring deference over stare decisis fades away entirely. 
After all, the judicial branch cannot thwart a congressional grant 
of authority when Congress has failed to grant such authority in 
the first place. While the risk of statutory law being ossified 
persists, it is not the mere freezing of statutory law that 
concerned the Brand X majority; what concerned the Court was 
the freezing of statutory law in the face of Congress vesting in an 
agency discretion to interpret a statute and change its mind as it 
pleases. That concern simply does not exist here, given that 
Congress has vested no such authority in the EEOC.76 
                                                                                                     
 75. See supra note 31. 
 76. Id. 
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In sum, in light of rule-of-law and separation-of-powers 
concerns, Brand X announced a limited exception to stare decisis 
in the face of contrary agency interpretations of unclear statutes 
deserving of Chevron deference. Yet, when an agency 
interpretation of an unclear statute earns mere Skidmore 
deference—as Baldwin should earn—the agency can eliminate 
any rule-of-law concerns—limited as they may be—by making its 
position known immediately. Moreover, the specter of a 
separation-of-powers concern simply does not exist here because 
Congress has not vested the EEOC with any authority to 
promulgate regulations pursuant to Title VII. As such, there is no 
reason to deviate from stare decisis here. Assuming a court 
resolves that Title VII is ambiguous concerning its applicability 
to prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, and so long as 
that court has already held that sexual orientation discrimination 
does not violate Title VII and there exists no way to distinguish 
that authority from the case at bar—the court should not 
overturn its own decision solely because of the Skidmore 
deference Baldwin earns.77 
IV. Conclusion 
Baldwin certainly serves as a tool to spread the news that 
the EEOC’s doors are open to claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination and further serves as a repository for future 
                                                                                                     
 77. This Article does not address the interplay between stare decisis and a 
contrary agency interpretation of an unclear statute that earns Skidmore 
deference when the agency has been vested with congressional authority to 
promulgate regulations implementing that statute (for instance, the 
interpretation could earn Chevron deference if the agency simply went through 
the required notice-and-comment period), but the agency has failed to issue such 
regulations. In such a case, “[b]ecause of the possibility that any judicial 
interpretation could be subsequently overridden by the agency, requiring a court 
to at least consider deference under Skidmore promotes judicial and 
administrative efficiency, and rule-of-law values in the predictability and 
stability of law.” Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory 
Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the 
Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 482 (2013). These countervailing 
concerns certainly support a Brand X-style exception to notions of stare decisis, 
although whether they are enough to tip the scales in favor of Skidmore 
deference remains to be seen. 
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litigants of some of the arguments plaintiffs have raised, and can 
raise, concerning sexual orientation discrimination under Title 
VII. Moreover, the opinion provides useful persuasive authority 
for those litigants seeking to distinguish cases that have held 
that such discrimination does not run afoul of Title VII and for 
those litigants who find themselves in that small universe of 
courts yet to address the viability of sexual orientation 
discrimination claims under Title VII. 
Yet, a watershed moment for advocates of LGBT workplace 
equality Baldwin is not. Indeed, because Skidmore should serve 
as the appropriate test by which to measure the level of deference 
courts should afford to any EEOC opinion, because Baldwin 
should garner de minimis deference under Skidmore, and because 
courts should not overturn their own precedent in the face of an 
EEOC opinion interpreting Title VII that earns such Skidmore 
deference, Baldwin should have no effect on the majority of 
courts in this country. Despite the EEOC’s efforts to fight LGBT 
discrimination in the workplace, the only way to ensure that 
courts will view Title VII as prohibiting employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is for Congress 
to do what it should have done ages ago: pass the Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act78 or its fresh-faced contemporary, the 
Equality Act.79 
                                                                                                     
 78. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
 79. Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). 
